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EDITOR'S PREFACE
Preparing this year's journal has
definitely been a learning experience
that has been both interesting and
challenging.
Because
of
my
inexperience as an editor, I ask you,
the reader, to overlook the mistakes in
the journal. Please do not allow them
to detract from the fine ideas presented
in these student papers.
They are
excellent papers.
I would like to thank Eric and
,;oanne Giordano for their help in
Also, Kendra
editing the papers.
Henderson deserves my gratitude for
not only editing a paper but for helping
with the technical problems of getting
the journal written out on Wordperfect.
I give special thanks to Joel Flake of
University Press for answering my
rnany questions. I am also grateful for
the professors who willingly gave of
their time and effort to judge the
writing contest. Finally, I give thanks
to my wife, Michelle, for her help in
typing up this journal and supporting
me in this project.
KEITH D. BENNETT

PROPAGANDA AND
REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES:
THE AMERICAN PROPAGANDA WAR
IN EUROPE
JESSIE S. CURTIS

Public support and legitimacy
wi th- the population are essential
elements
of
any
successful
revolution.
In 1989, the failure of
the Contra movement in Nicaragua and
the successes of FMLN forces in El
Salvador
clearly demonstrate
the
importance
of
popularity
and
legitimacy
of
revolutionary
organizations
among
local
populations.
Throughout the twentieth century,
a long series of Marxist, Maoist and
other revolutions have been carried
out by revolutionary organizations.
Most
organizations
have
been
popularly supported. The theories of
Lenin, Mao and other revolutionary
organizers imply that the general
population must be educated by the
revolutionary
party
about
the
benefits the revolution will bring.
Propaganda is a major tool in the
education of local populations.
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DEFINITION OF PROPAGANDA
As the battle lines of the Cold
War
solidified
in
the
1950s,
propaganda
acquired
a
decidedly
negative connotation: any news, books
or broadcasts harmful to the reigning
state
regime.
However,
Philip
Davidson provid~s a better definition
of propaganda:
Propaganda
is
simply
an
attempt to control the actions of
people indirectly by controlling
their attitudes, ... its primary
purpose
is
to obtain public
support for a particular idea or
course of action (Davidson 1941,
Intro.13).
In this sense, propaganda is any
information, publication or broadcast
used by a group, government-sponsored
or otherwise, to promote its own
cause or
point of view.
This
definition
of
propaganda
better
serves the purpose of examining the
relationship between
the
use
of
propaganda by a revolutionary party
and
that
party's
successful
attainment of its goal.
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USE OF PROPAGANDA NETWORKS
The revolutionary organization is
generally a small, conspiratorial
group working subversively at first
and becoming more open as support
increases.
The organization uses
propaganda to define ideology and
party objectives for its members, and
subsequently
it
presents
that
ideology
to
the
population.
Propaganda is a means to increase
sympathy for the movement while at
the same time foster discontent and
dissatisfaction with the established
governmental structure among local
populations.
The
effectiveness
of
revolutionary propaganda is directly
related
to
its
degree
of
organization. Of primary importance
is a network to disseminate rumors,
ideology and
information
to
the
target population. The party can set
up a network among its own supporters
first, and as the party becomes more
prominent, a ready-made network of
information dispersal is available.
A network
provides
for
"the
propagation
of
any
revolutionary
symbolism which takes the form of
what Lenin called 'propaganda' in the
narrow _ sense,
which
is
the
inculcation of central catchwords and
their
supporting
justifications"
(Lasswell 1977, 244).

3
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Lenin implies in his writings
that conflicts which occur during
social turmoil can be used to bring
the party gradually into the open if
the energy of the conflicts is turned
to support the revolutionary cause.
Harold Lasswell makes this comment
about Lenin's ideas:
The
propagation
of
any
revolutionary symbolism must take
the
form
of
what
Lenin
called ••. "agitation", or the use
of passing events for the turning
of
protest
in
revolutionary
directions (Lasswell, 244).
The tool to direct the energy of
conflict is propaganda.
Once the
revolutionary party is established,
the party educates the public through
propaganda.
The network is the
instrument used to disperse the views
of
the
party
to
the
target
population.
By
redirecting
the
actions
of
the
population,
revolutionaries can turn opinion in
favor of the revolutionary cause.

PROPAGANDA AND PARTY
POPULARITY
The party uses the network to
distribute
rumors,
ideology,
and
revolutionary publications, but it is

4
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also used as a feedback mechanism
from the population.
Waltruad Q.
Morales, in her critique of various
theories of revolution, refers to Ted
Gurr regarding the importance of
communication with the population:
As Gurr would argue, the
propaganda
must
have
some
legitimacy "to the extent that
[the propaganda] makes sense to
the discontented people in terms
of their specific deprivations
and
their
past
experiences"
(Morales 1973, 25-6).
Once
the
party
begins
to
propagate the ideology, mobilize the
public,
redirect
discontent
and
otherwise
"educate
the
public"
through propaganda, it must be aware
of the response the propaganda is
get ting.
At that point, the party
must decide which segments of society
are most receptive to their cause,
"select the most sui table appeals,
those most likely to influence the
groups in mind, and present them as
effectively as possible" (Davidson,
103) .

PROPAGANDA AND THE PARTY GOAL
The party must keep informed
about the effectiveness of various

5
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propaganda methods used.
Lasswell
comments that,
The
problem
of
the
revolutionist is to propagate his
alternative
symbol
and
his
revolutionary
way
of
life
in
competition
with
every
other
conceivable
symbol
and
practice
(Lasswell, 239).
If the party is not aware of
public
opinion
or
of
competing
propaganda
groups,
including
the
government, party propaganda will
probably fail to generate support.
'!'he network must be used for dual
purposes: as a means of information
dissemination and as an information
retrieval source.
Future propaganda
rna ter ial
can
also
be
found
in
feedback coming from the population.
If the party is sufficiently
organi zed
and
recept i ve
to
the
situation of competing groups, the
use of propaganda will effectively
destabilize
the
society.
Again
Morales refers to Gurr:
The greater the discontent of
members of a society, the greater
is their susceptibility "to new
ideologies,
and
less
complex
beliefs,
that
assert
the
righteousness and usefulness of
poli tical
violence"
(Morales,
25) •

At

this

point,

6

the

party

can

PROPAGANDA AND REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES
direct
the
discontent
of
the
population
towards
the
party
objective--change
in
society
and
government.

THE AMERICAN PROPAGANDA
CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE
Dur ing the social upheavals of
the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth
centuries, revolutionary parties were
out-of-favor with the government and
oper a ted underground. Nevertheless,
many
revolutionary
groups-Robespierre,
the
Jacobins,
and
Napoleon
in
France;
the
trade
unionists in Germany; the Whigs of
England
and
America--were
very
effective
in
disseminating
information and at instituting social
and structural reforms.
Among the
many revolutionary parties of that
period, the American founding fathers
successfully gained control of the
state and effected change in society.
Considering this, the American use of
propaganda to aid in achieving their
goal should be examined.

PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN
NEEDS IN EUROPE
The American propaganda campaign
7
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in Europe was waged by some of the
most
resourceful
leaders
of
the
American
revolutionary
movement.
liThe majority of [revolutionaries]
came from that fairly well-to-do
element
in
colonial
society
which ... was in virtual control of the
internal affairs of the colonies"
(Davidson, 31).
In 1775 when the first shots of
the American Revolution were fired,
revolutionary propaganda efforts in
the
colonies were
already wellorganized and had been very effective
in turning the population of the
colonies against the English King.
However, when the colonies turned to
Europe for military and monetary aid,
they met wi th diff icul ty; European
governments were hesitant to become
involved in a domestic conflict of
the Br i tish Empire.
Revolutionary
leaders
urged
the
Continental
Congress to declare independence from
Great Britain in order to more easily
secure European aid.
After
the
Americans
declared
themselves separate from the British
Empire,
American
propaganda
revolutionaries found themselves in
a climate relatively favorable to
their task. They quickly began their
campaign
to
weaken
British
credibility and secure aid from the
rest of Europe.

PROPAGANDA AND REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES
AMERICAN NETWORKS IN EUROPE
Lenin and Mao
realized
that
propaganda was an powerful method of
communication among revolutionaries.
They
saw
that
with
effective
communication and propaganda among
their
various
supporters,
the
revolutionaries could unify support.
When the Americans arrived in Europe
in 1775, they began to establish
these
types
of
subversive,
underground networks.
They sought
out
prominent,
wealthy,
liberal
citizens of the country and presented
the American case. Most of the time
this led to a new friend in the
nation
who
knew
a
printer
or
publisher willing to print American
news stories and propaganda.
These
efforts enabled the Americans to set
up
the
necessary
information
dispersal networks in Europe.
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams
were
especially
effective
in
enlisting
the
aid
of
European
nobility and professionals in the
American cause.
Early in 1777,
Franklin persuaded the duc de La
Rochefoucald d'Enville of France, a
wealthy,
young
aristocrat,
to
translate
and
publish
the
constitutions
of
the
thirteen
Americari states (Berger 1976, 167).
Through the aid of Charles Dumas,
John Adams met Hendrik Calkoen, Baron

9
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Jan Derck
van der
Capellen and
several Dutch newspaper publishers in
the Netherlands. The correspondence
Adams had with both Calkoen and van
der Capellen led to the printing of
some of the most inflammatory, antiBr i tish tracts that were published
during the whole course of the war.
Adams'
letters to Calkoen, a
prominent Amsterdam judge, were later
printed in the Netherlands as a
ser ies of pamphlets which detailed
the American government, social and
economic
systems
and
denigrated
British
attempts
to
destroy
the
American system.
Van der Capellen,
a vehemently anti-British politician,
at
one
point
in
1781
covertly
published a pamphlet entitled To the
People of the Netherlands, which
directly
attacked
the
Dutch
government "collaborators" as well as
British authorities in Holland. The
tract was so militant in tone that
the Dutch government offered a reward
of $2,500 for the arrest of the
author.
Van der Capellen was nev'er
exposed (Berger, 184).
These
underground
networks
expanded
rapidly
and
European
populations were exposed to American
propaganda. Dissatisfaction with the
pro-British
status quo
began
to
germinate.

10
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AMERICAN PROPAGANDA AND
PUBLIC OPINION
Many
European
nations
were
defeated by the British during the
Seven-years war.
Benjamin Frankl in
and
the
American
propagandists
constantly played upon feelings of
revenge
to
agitate
the
European
population against the British. The
news reports of American victories at
Saratoga and Trenton had tremendous
impact in changing European public
opinion about Amer ica.
In a report
~~ the Continental Congress in early
1778, the Americans noted that the
news had "occasioned as much general
joy in France as if it had been a
victory of their own troops over
their own enemies"
(Berger 173).
This tactic of attacking sore spots
was especially effective in France.
From the outset of the American
Revolution, the French were anxious
to aid the Americans in order to
avenge the French defeat of' a few
years before and perhaps regain some
of the territory they had conceded to
the
British.
In
Holland,
the
feelings of revenge were not as
strong, but playing upon the ant iBritish
sentiments
of
the
Dutch
merchants did succeed in providing a
loan to the Americans later in the
war (Berger 185).
11
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AMERICAN PROPAGANDA IN ENGLAND
Benjamin Franklin, like Lenin and
Mao
after
him,
realized
the
importance of attacking the enemy
government on horne territory. Before
the
outbreak
of
war,
Franklin
travelled to England and carne into
contact with David Williams, Thomas
Bundle, John Hone Toke and many other
anti-monarch
intellectuals
of
England.
These
men
organized
subversive societies notably, The
Society of 13 or Deistic Society-oI
1774,
to
actively
destroy
the
influence and control of the English
King.
When Franklin returned to Europe
in 1777, the members of the society
willingly
provided
Franklin
with
numerous propaganda channels into
English
society.
Regular
correspondence between these men kept
the latest American propaganda in
several English papers and sometimes
it
even
worked
its
way
into
Parliament (Berger 187).
When Franklin turned his efforts
to publicizing the raids of John Paul
Jones along the English coastline,
his English friends were able to
cause panic in the coastal towns of
Scotland.
Irish separatists were
also stirred up.
Irish dissent
became so widespread that in 1779,
King George III was forced to make
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numerous commercial and religious
concessions to avert an addi tional
conflict closer to home (Berger 175).
By fomenting domestic dissent
through these efforts, the American
propagandists began to turn European
public opinion towards support for
American interests.

GENERATING EUROPEAN INTEREST
ABOUT AMERICA
As the American propagandists
began
to use French,
Dutch and
English dispersal networks, letters
arrived from many areas of Europe
requesting some sort of news or
information about America and the
Amer ican war.
This information was
published in many European newspapers
and scholarly journals (Berger 168).
These
letters
provided
Franklin,
Adams and the others with some idea
of
how
far
their
information
travelled,
how
the
European
populations received it, and also
what effects British propaganda had
on the Europeans.
Centrally located in France and
Holland,
Benjamin
Franklin,
John
Adams, and Charles William Dumas
could now use the networks of old
friends and new acquaintances in
England, France, the Netherlands and
Germany
to
more
effectively

13
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distribute news about the American
war and provide focused information
about the emerging nation to European
populations. The correspondence from
editors
gave
the
American
propagandists some idea of what types
of information were producing the
desired results.
Factual reports of
American military victories and antiBritish "black" propaganda proved to
be the most effective items for the
Americans in changing the attitudes
of neutral European populations.

RESULTS OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA
The American propaganda campaign
began to bear fruit as European
countries joined in the conflict.
Benjamin
Franklin's
propaganda
efforts in England were successful in
frightening the English and Scottish
costal populations. His letter to a
Connecticut friend reflected on the
success:
we have occasioned a good
deal of terror and bustle in many
of the coastal towns], as they
imagined our Commodore Jones had
four thousand troops with him for
des~ents (Berger 177).
From the outset of the war, the
French
had
been
generally
pro-

J..J
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American.
They
provided
the
Amer icans wi th an ini tial base of
operations
to
wage
propaganda
campaigns.
French acceptance of
America also established credibility
with the other nations of Europe.
The
combination
of
Benjamin
Franklin's diplomatic and propaganda
efforts
ultimately
produced
the
valuable
Franco-AIDer ican
alliance
which gave the American colonies
badly needed monetary and military
aid.
The
results
in Holland were
probably the most successful. At the
beginning of the Revolution,
the
Dutch wanted to avoid a war with
England and assumed a pro-British
policy.
Through the efforts of
Charles Dumas and John Adams, Dutch
opinion was changed.
Carl Berger
believes that the 1780 Dutch decision
to join the Armed Neutrality, led by
Russia, was significantly influenced
by the combination of British naval
harassment and American propaganda
(Berger,185). However, the decision
to join with Russia was aborted by an
English declaration of war on The
Hague.
John Adams seemed particularly
pleased with the Dutch entrance into
the war on the Amer ican side.
In a
1782 letter to America, he quoted the
compliments of the Spanish minister
in The Hague which summar ized the
efforts of the Americans in Europe:

15
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Sir, you have struck the
greatest blow of all Europe.
It
is the greatest blow that has
been
struck
in
the American
cause, and the most decisive. It
is you who have filled this
nation with enthusiasm; it is you
who have turned all their heads
(Berger, 185).

CONCLUSION
The key to successfully achieving
a revolutionary change of society
lies
with
the
support
of
the
population.
Propaganda is the tool
used to build the unity and popular
support
which
are
essential
to
achieving party goals.
It is the
means by which supporters of the
party communicate.
Like Lenin and
Mao after the~, Benjamin Franklin and
the
Americans
understood
this
concept.
The
American
revolutionaries set up information
networks to spread propaganda to the
populations of Europe.
The American propaganda campaign
in Europe was a major factor in
turning European public opinion in
favor of the Amer ican cause.
The
informafion
dispersal
networks
established by Franklin, Adams and
others
were
effective
tools
for

16
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informing Europeans and increasing
support
for
America.
The
cor respondence betwee"n the Amer icans
and
the
European publishers and
editors
provided
a
gauge
of
popularity and effectiveness as well
as a feedback source about rival
groups and allowed the Americans to
focus and tune continuing propaganda
campaigns.
The effective use of propaganda
networks
and
methods
ultimately
served to accomplish the American
goal--to
create support
for
the
revolution.
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CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN ARIZONA
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
JANNA BROWN

In 1962 Representative Jack A.
Brown
spent
approximately
$350
getting elected to the Arizona State
House of Representatives where he
served for 6 terms, or 12 years,
before he was defeated.
In 1986, a
little less than 25 years after he
had first run for the legislature,
Mr. Brown spent in excess of $30,000
to successfully unseat an incumbent.
Even controlling for the effects of
inflation,
this
illustration
represents the fact that there has
been an obvious increase in the
amount of money necessary to run for
public office.
In recent years the
average cost of a legislative seat
has doubled or tripled in almost
every state for which there are
records (Jones 1984, 175).
Why the
large
increase?
What
factors
contribute to these rising costs?
More importantly, what measures are
being taken to control them?
These questions are not easily
answered, but the present political
climate in Arizona provides a perfect
opportunity
to
examine
campaign
spending and reform, and provides
insight as to possible answers to
such questions.
Before looking at
the Arizona experience specifically,
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however, I will briefly examine the
broader base of campaign spending and
reform.

Brief History of Campaign
Finance Laws
Not only has campaign spending
risen dramatically at
the
state
level, but at the national level as
well.
Costs
of
congressional
campaigns have skyrocketed in the
last decade, with the average House
open seat campaign running close to
$430,000 (Nelson and Magleby 1989,
35) .
Senate races are even more
expensive, due in part to a six-year
rather than a two-year term.
An
average campaign for an open Senate
seat costs over $3 million (Nelson
and Magleby 1989, 36).
Before 1972 it was much more
difficult to determine exactly how
much money was spent on national
races because there existed only
piecemeal
legislation
regulating
campaigns.
The Federal Election
Campaign
Act
of
1971
(FECA)
established
more
stringent
regulations
and
required
fuller
disclosure of political funding than
ever before (Alexander 1980, 29).
Watergate
caused
increasing
concern over the role of money in
corrupting
u.S.
elections,
which
20
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brought about the passage of the 1974
Amendments
to
the FECA.
These
Amendments placed overall limits on
how
much
could
be
spent
on
campaigning,
provided
public
financing for presidential campaigns,
and
established
political
action
committees
(PACs).
The
1974
Amendments also created the Federal
Election
Commission
(FEC)
to
administer and enforce the new laws.
In 1976, portions of the 1974
FECA
Amendments
were
ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in
the
case
Buckley
v.
Valeo.
Limitations
on
expenditures
were
struck down as violations of free
speech
guaranteed
by
the
First
Amendment.
The Court determined,
however, that limitations could be
imposed on candidates who accept
public funding.
Contribution limits
and public disclosure measures were
left intact (Alexander 1980, 34).
Addi tional Amendments were made to
the FECA in 1979.
Essentially, the
bill simplified record keeping and
public reporting requirements and
refined the procedural requirements
of the enforcement process (Alexander
1980,
37) .
As
Edwin
Epstein
observed, "Few developments during
the
past
decade have been more
important
to
American
electoral
politics than the virtual revolution
in campaign financing that occurred
i nth e 1 9 70s" (Ep s t e i n 19 8 0, 3 5 6 ) .
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Accompanying this onslaught of
campaign finance at the federal level
were a number of "post-Watergate"
reforms in many states. From 1972 to
1976, 49 states made some type of
revision to laws regulating political
money (Alexander 1980, 15).
These
laws were largely exper imental and
covered a
wide
range of
reform
tactics--from
strict
aggregate
spending ceilings to tight limits on
individual
contributions.
After
1976,
however,
many
states were
forced to change their laws in order
to comply with the ruling of Buckley
v. Valeo (Alexander 1980, 127).
Today, state campaign financing
remains governed by state law, so any
attempt
to compare
costs across
states is complicated by having to
consider
50
different
sets
of
campaign funding regulations (Jones
1984,172). States' campaign finance
laws
differ
in
many
aspects:
definitions
of
"expenditure"
and
"contribution"; allowances for public
funding; types, time periods, and
publication of disclosure reports.

The Role of State Legislatures
In the 1980s, state legislatures
play
an
increasingly
important
regulatory and policy making role
(Sabato 1984, 118).
Reagan's "new

22
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federalism"
put
far
more
responsibility into the hands of the
states
(Singer 1989, 1).
Frank
Sorauf asserts that "the diminution
of congressional responsibility in
areas such as social welfare during
the Reagan years may raise the stakes
i n state leg isla t i ve poli tics.
If
policy-making power flows to the
states, so will money seeking to pick
candidates
wi th
congenial
policy
goals" (Sorauf 1988, 261). This, as
Sorauf observed, indicates that money
is playing a larger role at the state
level than ever before.
State legislatures also control
congressional
and
legislative
redistricting
every
decennium.
Because this affects a party's fate
for an en tire decade, the party in
control of a state legislature tries
to draw these lines to obtain the
maximum number of congressional seats
possible.
Thus
the
state
legislatures
are
the
primary
determinants of the party balance in
the U. S. House of Representatives.
Given this important task, increasing
financial emphasis is likely to be
placed on state legislative races by
individuals and groups especially
concerned about influencing the party
control of the U.S. House.
Thi~
is especially likely to
occur in the election cycles prior to
reapportionment.
The
Republican
National Committee (RNC)
realized

23
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this in the 1960s and 1970s and
strengthened their state and local
organizations.
By the late 1970s,
the RNC had instituted a program
designed to influence the outcome of
state legislative races. John Bibby
reports that "the RNC gave direct
financial and technical support to
legislative
candidates
at
an
unprecedented level during the 1978
and 1980 campaigns" (1983, 128).
When
consider ing
the
growing
importance of states'
legislative
functions, it is not surprising that
the number of members who consider
themselves
"careerists"
is
increasing.
According
to State
Legislator's Occupations:
A Decade
of Change, a publication by the
National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
the
number
of
legislators
who
consider
the
legislature
to
be
their
sole
profession rose from approximately 9
percent in 1976 to possibly as high
as 20 percent in 1986 (Singer 1989,
l) .
NCSL' s Legislative Management
Program
Director
Sandra
Singer
observed that "it is becoming a fulltime job and a long-term career, and
as might be expected, re-election has
become
the
first
goal
on
many
legislators' agendas" (1988, 1).
Since
a
seat
in
a
state
legislature
has
become
more
attractive than ever, the influence
of money at the state level is also
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mUltiplying.
It follows, then, that
increasing attention is being given
to
legislation
governing
the
financing of state elections. A 1989
NCSL survey of pr ior i ty issues for
state
legislatures
reported
that
campaign finance was rated as the
highest pr ior i ty issue area in the
State Government Issues Category. Of
primary
concern
to
most
state
legislatures, it seems, is working to
see that their electoral systems do
not enable only the well-to-do to
seek public office.

Campaign Finance in Arizona:
A Case Study
Prior to 1986, Arizona had very
little legislation governing campaign
finance.
The
only
significant
requirements were disclosure before
and after the election.
Corporate
and labor union contr ibutions were
also prohibi ted.
These regulations
were too permissive to effectively
control campaign spending in Arizona
elections.
Individuals
worried
by
the
excessive
financial
influence
of
var ious interest groups drafted an
initiative to be placed on the ballot
in the 1986 election.
Proposition
200, the so-called "Clean Government
Initiative" was designed to "limit
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campaign
contributions
so as
to
prevent improper influence over state
and local elected officials and to
foster
public confidence
in the
integrity of government" (Anderson
1988, A17).
Evidently, voters were
concerned about the issue, because
Proposition
200
passed
by
an
overwhelming 2-1 margin.

The Facts About
Proposition 200
Proposition 200 places strict
limits on
the amounts PACs and
individuals
can
contribute
to
candidates.
Under
the
new law
individuals
are
prohibited
from
contributing
more
than
$200
to
local/legislative candidates and more
than $500 to statewide candidates.
As indicated by Table 1, PACs are
bound by the same limits, unless they
are certified by the Secretary of
State as having received funds from
at least 500 individuals in amounts
of $10 or more in the one year period
preceding the last closing report
date.
This
type
of
PAC
may
contribute $1000 to a local candidate
or $2500 for a statewide candidate.
The most stringent limit is the
aggregate limit of $5000 from all
PACs (local candidates) or $50,000
(statewide candidates).
All limits
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apply cumulatively to the primary and
general election.
As prescribed by Proposition 200,
these campaign limits are to be
adjusted annually for inflation. For
instance, the new 1989 aggregate PAC
limit for local races has been raised
to $5,500 rather than $5,000, and the
new individual/PAC limi t for local
candidates is now $220 rather than
$200.
Other provisions of the new law
prohibite the practice of collecting
checks or funds for the purpose of
passing
them onto a
candidate-commonly
called
"bundling",
"earmarking", which is the process of
sending a check to a PAC or other
committee with the specific objective
of passing the contribution on to a
selected candidate, and the transfer
of
funds
from one candidate
to
another. In compliance with previous
Arizona law, corporate funds are not
allowed
to
be
contributed· ~
candidate
elections.
While
the
Fed~ral Tax credit was abolished as
of January 1, 1987, Arizona still
allows tax deductions for political
contributions for state tax purposes.
Individuals can contribute a maximum
of $2000 to all political action
commi t tees a nd----St a tewide and local
candidates in Arizona in a calendar
year.
Contributions to political
parties are exempt from this $2000
limi t.
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There are no limitations on the
amount of money a candidate may
contribute
to
his
or
her
own
campaign.
However, there are some
rules governing such contr ibutions:
If a candidate contributes more than
$10,000 to a local campaign, or
$100,000 to a statewide campaign, he
or she must give written notice of
that contribution within 24 hours to
the Secretary of State and all other
candidates for that office. At that
point, contribution limits do not
apply to the other candidates in that
race until they exceed the $10,000 or
$100,000
contribution
levels.
According to an opinion by Attorney
General Bob Corbin, this apparently
means that until the $10,000/$100,00
limit is met, opponents could accept
contributions
from
PACs
and
individuals in excess of the $200 or
$500
limits
of
Proposition
200
(United For Arizona 1988a, 1).
Proposition 200 is to be enforced
by the County Attorney or Attorney
General who investigate complaints
filed
by
any
qualified
voter.
Violations will be dealt with as
Class One Misdemeanors, with knowing
violations resulting in up to 6
months in jail and up to $1,000 in
fines,
and
unknowing
violations
resultinB in civic penalty and up to
three times the amount of the illegal
contribution.
After the passage of Proposition
28
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200,
there was a great deal of
speculation as to just what its
effects would be.
Public interest
groups such as Arizona Common Cause
praised the new law, saying it would
reduce the flow of special interest
money into political campaigns and
put
an
end
to
the
big
money
individual
contributor
(Anderson
1988, A17).
Other players, such as
incumbent
legislators,
were
understandably less than thrilled
over the passage of "200".
Because
legislators
are
interested in their own electoral
success, it is no wonder that they
are opposed to strict regulations
such as those enacted by Proposition
200.
Dana Larsen,
director of
Arizona Common Cause, observed that
"most
people
there
[in
the
legislature]
do
not
find
great
comfort and joy in Proposition 200.
I
think
it's probably the most
unloved piece of work that's in the
statutes right now" (Van De Voorde
1988,10). But, Larsen maintains, it
is their own fault legislators. are
not happy with the new law, because
"i t was their own inaction on the
issue of campaign finance reform that
brought them this" (Van De Voorde
1988, 10).
As k.i n g
s elf - i n t ere s ted
legislators
to create
the
rules
governing the method by which they
and their challengers are elected is
29
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not the most logical mode of creating
legislation. Yet submitting a long,
complex proposal to a simple yes-orno decision by oftentimes apathetic
or
unknowledgeable
voters
seems
equally inefficient (Broder 1976,
320) .
Whether the public should be
using the initiative process on such
complex issues as campaign finance
reform
is
one
of
the
central
questions
in
the
debate
over
Proposition 200.

The Results of
Proposition 200
Although views differ on the
merit of Proposition 200, an analysis
of 1986 and 1988 contr ibutions and
expenditures data allows conclusions
to be drawn as to the results of the
new law. The most obvious result of
the tough new campaign laws enacted
by the 1986 passage of Proposition
200
was
a
marked
decrease
in
contributions from PACs, as depicted
in
Figure
1.
In
1986,
PACs
contributed $1.1 million to Arizona
candidates. In 1988 the amount of PAC
contributions decreased 65 percent-to $388,136 (Harris 1989, Ai). The
most drastic individual example is
House Minority Leader Art Hamilton,
who dropped from $43,269 in PAC
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contributions in 1986 to $4,834 in
1988,
a
reduction of nearly 90
percent.
Total contributions also
decreased in 1988--from a 1986 total
of $2.4 million to $1.8 million, a
decrease of 25 percent.
For the
first
time
since
1974,
total
expenditures
decreased
from
the
previous
year's
totals.
1988
candidates spent a total of $1.8
million, down from $2.2 million in
1986, a 20 percent decrease.
As
shown
in Figure
2,
the average
winning
candidate for
the
state
legislature
spent
$19,565,
as
compared to $24,420 in 1986.
This
represents a total dollar reduction
of $4,855 per race, and a percentage
reduction of 20 percent.
These
figures
provide
a
remarkable
contrast
to
previous
contributions
and
expenditures.
Common Cause of Arizona has been
tracking campaign spending and PAC
contributions in Arizona since 1974,
where they have observed a steady
escalation of PAC involvement and
expenditures by candidates (it should
be noted that these percentages are
not in constant dollars and do not
account
for
the
effects
of
inflation).
Between 1984 and 1986,
campaign spending increased by 54
percent.- In 1986, for the first time
in
Arizona's
history,
winning
candidates spent over $2 million for
seats in the legislature.
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Also for the first time, PACs
contributed over $1 million to those
races for an average of over $12,500
per race--the first time this figure
topped $10,000. In light of these
figures, the 1988 data provide a
remarkable
contrast
to
previous
year's data. In sum, Proposition 200
decreased the amount of money raised
and spent by the winning candidates
for the Legislature.

The Role of PACs
The
role
political
action
committees play in our electoral
system is a topic surrounded by much
debate.
Though PACs have been
extremely
influential
in
congressional elections for several
years now, their rise at the state
level has been more recent. As Larry
Saba to observed, "There is Ii t tIe
question
that
PACs
contribute a
growing proportion of campaign money
in
states
and
localities,
particularly in races for the state
legislature"
(1984,
117).
For
example, between 1974 and 1982, the
number of registered PACs in Arizona
increased by more than five times
(Sorauf 1988, 269).
Larrj
Sabato
terms
the
establishment of many national PACs
at
the
state
level
the
" new
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federalism" of PACs (1984, 120). In
1981-82, more than four in ten of the
federal- multicandidate
PACs
also
contr ibuted
to
state
and
local
candidates.
Sabato observed that
"even if the U.S. Congress were still
the center of a group's attention, it
had good reason to look to the state
capi tals:
most recent congressmen
first served as state legislators,
and a contribution made early in
their careers was likely to be well
remembered" (Sabato 1984, 118).
The most detailed study on PAC
influence at the state legislative
level was conducted in California.
Its results are synonymous with those
in Arizona--campaign costs are rising
dramatically,
PACs
are
extremely
influential, PAC support is necessary
for
a
successful
campaign,
and
incumbents are widening their fund
raising advantage over challengers
(California Commission on Campaign
Financing 1985, 3).
Ruth Jones, an
expert
in
the
field
of
state
legislative campaign finance, found
that
not
all
PACs
exert
equal
influence.
Recent state PAC growth
has
been
disproportionate
among
business and professional interests
(Jones 1984, 188).
There is little consensus among
the key-players of the system as to
the degree of influence exerted by
PACs.
Obviously, many people are
concerned
that
PAC
money
buys
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influence. Alan Rosenthal, director
of the Eagleton Institute of Politics
at Rutgers University, says that PAC
influence
"gives
an
unseemly
appearance because it looks like
people are buying influence.
Legislators are aware and concerned
about contributors.
I don't know
what that buys but certainly it buys
a sympathetic ear" (Singer 1988, 25).
Other observers feel that because
the public is not extremely aware of
the
activities
of
their
state
legislature,
corruption
is
more
likely to occur at the state level
than in Congress, where the members
are
subject
to
almost
constant
scrutiny. In comparing PAC influence
in the Missour i legislature to PAC
influence in the U.S. Congress, Jerry
Brekke summar ized: "At the national
level,
the
great
publici ty
and
concern expressed over PAC activity
may, to some extent, be a restriction
on
possible abuses.
Since
the
Missouri legislature and many state
legislatures are not subject to such
public scrutiny, PACs may present
more serious problems than they do at
the national level
(Brekke 1988,
103)."
The
foremost
issue
in
the
Proposi tion 200 debate is centered
around PACs and how much influence
they should have.
An interesting
argument explaining the emergence of
PACs in recent years is proposed by
34
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Lee Ann Elliott. She claims that the
PAC movement is a natural and healthy
addi tion to the Arner ican poli tical
process.
Ell iot t
compares
the
development of PACs to overall social
changes
currently
taking
place,
claiming that the biggest change in
our political behavior has grown out
of the increasing mobili ty of our
society.
We used to associate as
neighborhood groups, but this is no
longer
the
case.
Improved
communication and transportation have
caused
us
to
broaden
our
associations. This change has had an
effect on political behavior because
political activity no longer revolves
around
precinct,
or
neighborhood
poli tics.
We are not influenced by
neighborhood leaders, but rather by
occupational
or
socio-economic
leaders. Thus, asserts Elliott, the
rise of PACs is merely a response to
these developing behavioral changes.
These socio-economic organizations
have developed as a substitute for
geographic
or
neighborhood
associations (Elliott 1980, 540-1).
If examined in terms of Elliott's
argument,
strict
limits
on
the
ability of PACs to contribute to
candidates are an invasion on the
right of individuals to associate in
groups, - whether those groups are
geographical or socio-economic.
A
related
argument
is
proposed by
Robert L'Ecuyer, a Phoenix attorney,
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lobbyist, and campaign consultant.
He asserts that the central problem
of
Proposi tion
200
is
that
it
severely handicaps groups of two to
500 people (1988, A16).
Because
these groups do not meet the "SuperPAC" requi rement of 500 contr ibutors,
they are limited to donations of
$200--the same amount an individual
is able to give.
This is a much
tighter requirement than the federal
statute--where
only 50 rather than
500
people can gain
"Super-PAC"
status, and thus have higher limits
on how much they may contribute.
L'Ecuyer further argues that the
founders of the U.S. Constitution
understood that an individual alone
is
no
match
for
big
power
or
influence, and expected that groups
would be formed in order to promote
government attention to their needs
and concerns. This is why freedom of
association is included in the Bill
of Rights.
L'Ecuyer cites a hypothetical
example to illustrate his point: 50
people in a neighborhood upset by a
zoning decision decide to form a
committee and to support a candidate
for mayor.
Each person can spare
$10, which they realize is a small
amount, so they pool their money and
send $ 500 to the candidate.
Under
Proposition 200,
this is illegal
because the group cannot contribute
over $200.
The zoning problem was
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created by a rich neighbor.
He and
his wife can each give $200, a total
of $400, to the opposing candidate.
Furthermore,
the
big
corporation
planning to build on the rich man's
land
can
run
an
II independent
expendi ture campaign II through its PAC
and spend an unlimited amount.
How
can the neighborhood be expected to
compete
if
it
cannot
pool
its
resources?
This is a valid argument. Small
groups should not be discouraged from
attempting to make an impact on
politics by contribution limits that
are too restrictive.
In L'Ecuyer's
words,
liThe
change
in
law
[Proposition 200] was intended to
1 imi t PACs set up by big labor and
corporations.
Instead, it strangles
every small and medium-sized group
trying to give the little guy a
voice ll (L'Ecuyer 1988b, A16).
Another controversy associated
with
PACs
is
that
they
disproportionately favor incumbents.
Incumbency is a very strong factor in
determining the outcome of elections.
Nationally,
98
percent
of
congressional officeholders won reelection in 1988. The numbers at the
state level are lower, but still
significant.
Around 80 percent of
state lawmakers seeking re-election
are returned to office (Hansen 1988,
:'..4).
William T. Pound, executive
director of the National Conference
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of State Legislatures, believes that
because
of
sophisticated
redistricting, superior fundraising
abilities, and power of incumbency
there are "very few state legislative
seats that are competitive" (Hansen
1988, 16).
One of the constants in PAC
behavior is that PAC spending favors
incumbents (Sorauf 1988, 266).
The
reason
is
simple:
PACs
favor
incumbents because incumbents are
more
likely
to
win.
In most
circumstances, it does not benefit a
PAC to give to a losing candidate.
For this reason, nearly 99 percent of
PAC money at the state legislative
level goes to incumbents (Singer
1988,
25).
Gary
Jacobson
has
concluded that because incumbents are
generally better known, they need
less campaign money but are able to
raise more.
Challengers, however,
need more money but have trouble
raising it (Jacobson 1980).
This
paradox is one of the fundamental
problems of the current campaign
finance system. The
Arizona
data
clearly show that incumbents receive
more PAC funds than challengers.
In
1986,
the
average
non-incumbent
brought in about $5,000 less than the
average
House
of
Representatives
incumbent.
Only three of the nonincumbent candidates raised more than
$10,000
in PAC money,
while
31
incumbents in the House raised more
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than
$10,000.
No
challengers
accumulated
over
$20,000
of PAC
dollars, yet seven House incumbents
topped $20,000.

Interpretations Of Proposition
200--Strengths and Weaknesses
~here
is
no
dispute
that
Proposition
200
decreased
PAC
contributions tremendously.
Also,
the candidates' disclosure reports
revealed that less money was received
and spent in legislative races than
ever before.
Does this mean, as
Common Cause asserts, that candidates
"took
less
money
and
fewer
obligations from the PACs?" (Arizona
Common
Cause
1989,
1)
Not
necessarily. Not everyone perceived
Proposition 200 as such a panacea.
Robert L'Ecuyer is perhaps the most
vocal opponent.
He said of the new
laws, "After 18 months of detailed
study of campaign finance statutes
and cases from all 50 states and the
federal government, I have concluded
that
Arizona's
campaign
finance
statutes are among the four or five
worst in the U.S." (L'Ecuyer 1988a).
Conclusions about the overall utility
of Proposition 200 can be reached by
examining these opposing viewpoints.
However, this is a difficult task and
is largely speculative considering
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the new law has only been in effect
for one election cycle.
Proponents of Proposition 200
cite
the
decrease
in
PAC
contributions as the primary benefit
of the new law. This is expected to
have the long-term effect of forcing
candidates to rely more heavily on
smaller
contributions
from
individuals. This is especially true
for incumbents who are, as former
Common Cause director John Anderson
claimed, "going to have to broaden
their appeal beyond the relatively
narrow circle of traditional special
interest contributors" (1988, A17).
Related to the limitation of PAC
contributions will be an increase of
competitiveness, with a rise in the
number
of
serious
challengers~
Again, incumbents are likely to be
hurt by the increased ability of
challengers to raise enough funds to
mount a respectable campaign.
Another anticipated result of
Proposition 200 is the strengthening
of the political parties. Political
parties are exempt from the $2000
limit that individuals can give to
candidates
and
PACs.
This
is
expected to encourage individuals to
contribute to the parties and let the
parties distribute those funds to the
candidates they desire.
Proposition 200 prohibits the
transfer of campaign funds from one
candidate to another. This prohibits
40
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members of the House and Senate from
giving money to other members to
acquire legislative influence. Some
claim this is undue influence, while
others argue that fundraising is a
tool that the leaders need since many
traditional leadership methods have
eroded in recent years. Thus, it is
argued that transfers strengthen the
parties
by
making
individual
legislators
more
accountable
to
leadership (Singer 1988, 27).
The
prohibition
of
these
transfers,
however, as in Proposition 200, keeps
the
legislative
leadership
from
raising large sums of money and
doling it out to loyal incumbents or
recruiting
challengers
to
defeat
uncooperative incumbents.
While Proposi tion 200 may have
its strengths, it is not without its
weaknesses.
Var ious
"loopholes"
exist
that
allow
PACs
and
corporations
to donate
funds
to
influence elections in ways that are
not
included
in
the candidates'
reported
expenditures
and
contributions.
For
example,
unlimited independent expenditures
are allowed under Proposi tion 200.
Independent expenditures are funds
spent
by
an
individual
or
organization
for
or
against
a
candidate
but
without
any
coordination
with
the
candidate.
They offer a legal, effective means
of influencing a campaign since they
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are
not
prohibited by state or
federal statutes.
I n d e pen den t
expenditure campaigns (lECs) have
traditionally
been
run
for
congressional candidates, though with
the passage of strict limitations on
PAC
contributions such as
those
imposed by Proposition 200, lECs are
turning up at the state level as
well.
Ninety-five percent of the
business PACs in Arizona do not meet
the Super Pac requirement of 500
contributors, so they are able to
donate only $200 per candidate. PAC
funds, then, are still multiplying,
while the number of candidates able
to
accept
funds
has
decreased
rapidly.
Thus, lECs present a way
for PACs to legally exert influence
on
desired
races.
United
for
Arizona, a nonprofit trust that has
helped set up most of Arizona's
business
PACs,
sponsored a
poll
designed to measure public opinion of
political campaigns run independently
of candidates.
The study concluded
that
the
public
is
generally
favorable toward such campaigns, and
therefore United recommended that
TECs for Arizona races provide a
visible
alternative
to
direct
candidate
support
and
can
be
successfully run with only a slight
degree of risk involved (United for
Arizona 1988b, 4-5).
Another
"loophole",
or
alternative
method
of
PAC
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contributions to candidates occurs in
the
"constituent
communications"
provision.
Attorney General Bob
Corbin issued an opinion stating that
money raised for newsletters does not
fall under Proposition 200 and does
not have to be reported as long as
the publications are paid for sixty
days pr ior to an elect ion (Van De
Voorde 1988, 10).
This appears to
allow PACs and corporations to donate
unlimited amounts of money to a
candidate, as long as it is used for
a newsletter. But since legislators
are not required to make any public
accounting of these funds, no one
knows who contributes how much to
whom or how the money is actually
spent.
One reason PACs and corporations
are turning to these alternatives is
because
they
have
more
funds
available than there are candidates
available to accept them, because of
Proposition 200's $5,000 aggregate
PAC contributions limit. Because of
this limit, legislators are likely to
begin their campaigns earlier and
earlier in the election cycle (United
for Arizona 1988c, 1). PAC managers
are realizing that many legislators
will "max out" at the allowable
$5,000 months before they -actively
start campaigning.
As Uni ted for
Arizona complains, "Our problem with
Proposition 200 is it forces PACs
into a ridiculous race to see which
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25 can "beat" the others in making
contributions
before
the
$5,000
aggregate is reached."
In light of
this problem, it is no wonder that
PACs and corporations are searching
for
other
viable
options
of
supporting candidates.
The enforcement provisions of
Proposition 200 are very ambiguous.
Supposedly the County Attorney or the
Attorney General will investigate
claims filed by voters. Not only is
the wording of the provision vague,
there is no automatic method of
oversight--only
complaints
are
investigated.
It seems that the
responsibility of enforcement ought
to
be
entrusted
ei ther
to
the
Secretary of State or to some type of
independent agency similar to the
Federal Election Commission at the
national level.
A problem related to the lack of
an enforcement agency lies in the
disclosure laws.
Though the public
disclosure
of
contributions
and
expendi tures has been a large step
forward in decreasing the amount of
illegal money involved in elections,
there is still room for improvement.
At the present time, the Secretary of
State
houses
the
disclosure
information but publishes no type of
compilation or report. The rationale
behind public disclosure is that it
will in itself police candidates into
complying with campaign finance laws.
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If disclosure reports were published
in a timely manner, they would be
much
more
likely
to
impact
candidates' behavior.

Conclusion
It
is
clear
that
there are
differing
opinions
regarding
the
effectiveness of Proposition 200. As
previously stated, it is difficult to
draw
conclusions
about
how well
Proposition 200 will work after just
one election cycle has elapsed. The
most visible effect in the 1988
election was the reduced amount of
contributions
from
PACs.
Legislators, PACs, public interest
groups such as Common Cause, the
media, and the general public all
have differ ing opinions as to what
aspects of Proposition 200, if any,
should be revised.
In general,
legislators favor raising PAC limits.
Common Cause advocates leaving the
limits
as
strict
as
they
are
presently, plus eliminating apparent
loopholes in Proposition 200.
Reaching a compromise between these
groups with competing interests will
not be easily accomplished. A joint
legislat~ve
committee is currently
considering revising the campaign
finance statutes. For the most part,
the proposed changes will relax the
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present
contribution
limits
and
structure Arizona's campaign finance
system-more like the federal system.
Clearly, these proposals will not
satisfy all of the players involved,
nor are they likely to solve all of
the existing problems.
Likewise,
Proposition 200 did not solve every
problem
nor
satisfy
every
participant.
Nonetheless, I would
argue
that
both
attempts
are
beneficial in helping to solve the
complex
problems
associated
with
campaign
financing
in
Arizona
legislative elections.
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MARONITE CONFLICTS AND
THE RISE OF BASHIR GEMAYEL
EZRA T. CLARK

The
outbreak
of
the
second
Lebanese Civil War in 1975 and the
collapse
of
the
Lebanese
state
transformed Lebanon from a model
Middle
Eastern democracy
into a
notorious
example
of
anarchy,
factionalism, and repression.
Most
often
the
Lebanese conundrum is
explained
in
terms
of
religious
animosity
between
Muslims
and
Christians
and
as
a
political
struggle between the Left and Right.
Undoubtedly these have been the most
ostensible causes of the fourteen
year civil war. What is less known,
however, is the extent to which the
Muslims
and Maronites
have been
ripped apart by competing internal
fact ions.
Wi thin
the
Maroni te
community, the struggle for power at
the beginning of
the Civil War
exacerbated long-standing feuds that
had existed since the creation of the
National Pact in 1943.
One curious
phenomenon of the Civil War was that
once
the
shooting
began,
intrareligious killing also
became more
prevalen t".
In fact, the f ree-forall mentality of the Civil War, it
appears,
gave Bashir Gemayel the
opportunity to consolidate his power
and eliminate his rivals for the 1982
presidential election.
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Outbreak of Civil War
In
order
to
understand
the
changes that occurred within the
Maronite community, it is important
to understand the drastic changes
that took place in Lebanon as a
whole.
Before 1975, Lebanon was
considered the business, cultural,
and democratic center of the Arab
world.
However, the Lebanese Civil
War changed all this.
By most accounts, the Lebanese
Civil War began at Ain Rummaneh, a
Chr istian suburb of East Bei rut on
April
13,
1975.
At
a
Sunday
gather ing, unknown assailants fired
on Pierre Gemayel, leader of the
Maronite Phalanges and killed two of
his
bodyguards.
Hours
later,
Phalange militiamen ambushed a bus
full of Muslim political activists.
Twenty-eight
passengers
were
massacred (see Khalidi 1979, 47).
Throughout
the
country,
clashes
broke-out between maronite military
groups and members of the Muslimdominated National Movement.
The
fighting
gradually
snowballed.
By September 1975, two
chief
belligerents
emerged:
the
predominantly
Christian
Lebanese
Front ann the Nationalist Movement,
comprised of Druzes, Shiites, Sunnis
and Lebanese Communists. In December
of the same year,
the Palestine
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Liberation
Organization
(PLO)
officially entered the war.
The
reason the PLO hesi tated for over
seven months was most likely a result
of wanting to avoid overt war with
the Maronites. In the first year of
the war, nearly 50,000 Lebanese were
killed (McDowall 1983, 50).

Internal Maronite Conflicts
A significant source of friction
between the Lebanese Christians and
non-Christians was the National Pact
of
1943,
an
agreement
between
President Bishara aI-Khouri and Prime
Minister Ryad al-Sulh requiring that
the major government positions be
divided
among
Lebanon's
largest
religious sects.
As the largest
religious faction in Lebanon, the
Maronites,
with
52
percent
of
population (according to the 1932
census--the only official census in
Lebanese history), were guaranteed
the presidency (see McDowall 1983,
11).
The institutionalization of
government
positions
created
stability for over thirty years among
the Muslims, Christians, and later
the Palestinians; however, in the
short
run,
a
fractur ing
effect
occurred
within
the
Maronite
community.
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The Maroni te communi ty, perhaps
the
most
politically
visible
religious
group
in
"Lebanon,
historically has been plagued by
inveterate family and presidential
rivalries.
In fact, in the typical
Middle Eastern pattern of patriarchal
leadership, the major factions within
the
Maroni te
communi ty
coalesced
around a political strongman who, in
most cases,
was either a former
president of the Lebanese Republic or
a
prominent
politician
with
presidential aspirations.
Indeed,
the presidency was the crowning jewel
in any Maronite family's treasure
chest. With the presidency carne the
prestige
of
international
recognition, the ability to solidify
political alliances, and the means to
dispense patronage.
In fact, in
order to understand the effects of
the institutionalized presidency, it
is
important
to
understand
the
history of rivalry between the major
Maronite factions and the changes
that took place in Lebanese society.
A combination of these factors as
well as the 1975 Civil War account
for Bashir Gemayel's rise to power.

Chamoun's National Liberal Party
Following World War II, the most
influential
Maronite
leader
was
Camille Chamoun, the president and
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founder
of
the
National Liberal
Party. With his British connections
and his pro-Arab positions, he was
respected by Arabs and Maronites
alike.
In fact, Chamoun's strong
Arab views helped him defeat his
political rival Hamid Franjieh in
1952 after President Bishara alKhouri resigned (see Deeb 1980, 25).
However,
during
Chamoun's
presidency his relationship with the
muslim community declined. According
to Marius Deeb, "(Chamoun) did not
have a stable working partnership
(between 1952 and 1956) with a strong
Muslim leader as prime minister"
(Deed 1980,
26).
Also, Chamoun
exploi ted
Maroni te
fears
that
Nasserism
was
undermining
the
independence of Lebanon. As part of
his plan to protect Lebanon from the
pervasive influence of Nasserism and
Pan-Arabism, Chamoun announced his
acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine
in 1957.
By
accepting
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine (which enabled U.s. allies
to request mili tary· help from the
United States) Chamoun placed Lebanon
in open opposition with Egypt and
Syria.
Consequently,
Chamoun
disillusioned his Sunni Muslim allies
and
atomized
Maronite
political
unity. ·Conservative Maronites, such
as Raymond Iddi, Pierre Gemayel and
Charles Malik supported Chamoun's new
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stand,
However, prominent Christian
leaders 1 ike Hamid Franj ieh, Henr i
Far'un,
and Charles Hilu openly
criticized
him for placing the
government on a collision course with
Egypt and Syr ia (see Cobban 1985,
86) .

The Shihabist Party
The U.S. Marines landed in Beirut
in July 1958.
Arguing for Lebanese
domestic stability, the United States
pressured Chamoun not to run for an
unprecedented second term. with U.S.
support,
General
Fuad
Shihab
reluctantly agreed to run for the
presidency.
In the 1958 elect ion,
Shihab received nearly seven times
the votes of his opponent Raymond
Iddi.
The Shihabist era covered both
Shihab's own term (1958-64) and that
of his successor and disciple Charles
Hilu (1964-70). The primary concern
of the Shihabist governments was the
economic
development
of
Lebanon.
During
this
period
the
Lebanese
Christians took advantage of their
tradition of commercial and financial
expertise. Vast amounts of fugitive
Arab capital flowed into Beirut--the
bastion
of
stability
in
the
tumultuous
Middle
East.
The
Shihabist governments catered to the
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merchant classes by lifting foreignexchange
controls
and
enacting
banking secrecy laws.
Undoubtedly, Lebanon during the
Shihabist
era
experienced
great
economic gains.
However, a small
portion
of
the
populace
reaped
inordina te economic benef i ts.
For
example, during the 1960s, 4 percent
of the population disposed of 32
percent of the GNP.
The bottom 50
percent accounted for only 18 percent
of GNP (McDowall 1986, 13).
Also, the Lebanese geo-political
landscape changed considerably. From
1930 to 1980, Beirut increased in
population by tenfold. By 1977, only
39 percent of Lebanon I s population
was
rural.
Consequently,
the
infamous "Belt of Misery" encircled
prosperous Beirut (and also Tyre,
Tripoli, and Sidon) in a ring of slum
and squatter areas.
The Maronites, like every group
in
Lebanon
during
the
1960s,
struggled to adapt politically to the
significant
political
changes.
Increasingly, many Christians and
most
non-Christians
viewed
the
Shihabists as the party of the jetset Beirut socialites (see Cobban
1985, 95).
The Maronite Community
became more visibly divided between
the mountain and the city.
The
poorer, non-urban Maronites became
identified with the more militant
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Phalange and Franjieh parties, Urban
Maronites, especially the merchant
and professional classes, advocated
tolerant
Arabic
policies.
Conversely, the less educated, rural
residents of Northern and Central
Lebanon
favored
a
less
tolerant
attitude towards the Arab World and
strongly
advocated
Lebanese
nationalism.
In fact, the gap separating the
Maroni te communi ty was widening so
rapidly during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, it seems that only an
event as threatening as the Civil War
could have re-united the Maronite
community.

The Franjieh Family
Another Maroni te poli tical leader
at the time of the Civil War was
SUlayman Franjieh who replaced his
brother, Hamin, as party leader in
the late 1950s. SUlayman Franjieh's
1970 election win over Shihabist
presidential candidate Ilyas Sarkis
was
something
of
a
surprise.
Franjieh's election was, in part, a
resul t of the non-urban Maroni tes'
political mobilization.
Howeyer,
Franjeih's
election
augured a disturbing trend within the
Maronite community. Because Franjieh
had
only
a
regional
political
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following near Zgharta, his clan's
headquarters,
he
naturally
had
difficulty
inspiring
his
fellow
countrymen and co-religionists.
As
tensions mounted in the early 1970's,
Maronite paramilitary groups began to
act individually on behalf of the
state (see Stoakes 1975, 221). In
short, Franjieh's inexperience and
manipulability created a vacuum that
Bashir Gemayel and his Phalangist
military were eager to fill.

The Phalange Party
The rise of the Phalange Party,
led by the Gemayel family,
was,
perhaps,
the
most
interesting
development
within
the
Maronite
community since the creation of the
Na t ional Pact,
Before the Phalange
Party's emergence, the schisms within
the Maroni te communi ty stemmed, as
already
mentioned
primarily
from
familial,
geographic,
and
socioeconomic differences.
The Phalange
changed the political battle into a
military war.
The Phalange party was organized
in
1936
by
Pierre
Gemayel,
a
pharmacist.
Gemayel patterned the
party organization after the Sokol
youth
groups
he
observed
while
visiting Germany for the 1936 Olympic
Games. During the first years of its
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existence, the party was essentially
an apolitical youth athletic club.
However,
the 1958 Civil War
politicized the party and increased
Phalangist clout. From mid-September
to mid-October 1958, the Phalanges
kidnapped
travellers,
killed
and
tortured people found in the "wrong
areas," and participated in some of
the bloodiest events of the 1958
Civil War (see Cabban 1985, 91).
Also, the Phalanges were able to
successfully call for mass strikes in
certain parts of Greater Beirut in
order to challenge the authority of
the new Shihabist regime. Before the
end of October 1958, Shihab decided
to placate the Phalanges by including
them for the first time ever in
Lebanese government.
According to
historian Samir Khalaf the 1958 war
"enlarged the political constituency
of the party and transformed it from
a paramilitary youth movement into a
disciplined and highly organized mass
party" (89).
Interestingly, Phalangist military
prowess in both the first and second
civil wars propelled the Phalangists
into power.
In fact, it seems that
the Phalange has excelled the most
politically during times of civil
war.
For example, some experts
believe -that without the first or
second civil wars, the Phalange would
not have had a realistic chance at
the presidency (Haddad 1983, 118).
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During the late 1960's and early
1970s the Phalangists relied more
heavily on their military prestige
and
anti-Palestinian
rhetoric.
Reflecting
the
party's
antiPalestinian
viewpoint,
Bashir
Gemayel, in a 1979 interview said, "I
am in favor of any solution which
would
relieve
us
of
600,000
Palestinians ... We gave them all the
necessary facilities. The result of
their ingratitude was the war of '75"
(Gemayel 1979, 58).
It appears that a combination of
anti-Palestinianism and the reckless
leadership of President Franjieh led
many
Phalangists,
especially
the
younger, more radical faction of the
party, to believe the Lebanese state
was incapable of dealing with the PLO
challenge and Muslim calls for a
redistribution
of
power.
Consequently, the party became more
willing to use its military prowess
to
enforce Maronite
hegemony
in
Lebanon.
In
other
words,
the
Phalangists
became,
by
selfdefinition,
"the
supervigilantes .•• builder, surrogate,
and
defender
of
the
state"
(Rabinovich 1984, 63).
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Rise of Bashir Gemayel
Without
question,
the
new
militaristic emphases in Phalangist
policies detailed nicely with Bashir
Gemayel's prescription for Lebanon's
ills.
In 1975, Bashir Gemayel, at
age 27, was a major player in the
Phalange Party. On August 30, 1976,
Bashir was elected commander of the
Joint Command Council of the Lebanese
Forces (Snider 1984, 8).
Bashir
succeeded William Hawi,
who was
killed while inspecting his troops at
Tal Zaatar on July 13, 1975. Hawi's
death was so fortunate for Bashir's
career,
that many Lebanese were
convinced that he was responsible
(see Randal 1980, 115). Considering
Bashir's proclivity for temerarious
behavior, it is not surprising that
the party elders, including Pierre
Gemayel, only hesitatingly endorsed
him in his new position as the
commander of the Lebanese Defense
Forces (Randal 1983, 115).
However,
if the party elders
feared Bashir would usurp power from
them, they were mistaken. Bashir, it
would appear, had no intention of
taking over the party that his father
had built; instead, with his military
power, . Bashir
built
his
own
organization. According to Jonathan
Randal the men who comprised the
Lebanese Forces "were Bashir' s men
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and not those of his father's and his
brother's party' (Randal 1983,118).
This is important because Bashir
knew he could count on his own men to
consolidate power and eliminate his
political and military rivals.
In
fact, on at least two occasions,
Bashir massacred those whom he felt
stood
between
himself
and
the
presidency.
For example, in June 1978 about
one-hundred of Bashir's men attacked
the Franjieh house in Zgharta and
killed Tony Franjieh, commander of
the Marada Br igade.
Bashir excused
his actions as a legitimate mistake.
However, the fact that Tony Franjieh
was
the
heir
to
the
Franjieh
political dynasty and Bashir's chief
Maronite
military
rival
makes
Bashir's
claim
seem
almost
ridiculous.
The
bloodiest
of
Bashir's
consolidating efforts occurred on
July 7, 1980, when troops under his
command simultaneously attacked the
barracks, offices, and storehouses of
Camille
Chamoun's
Tiger
militia,
killing approximately 500 Christians.
Despite the immediate outrage
from
the
majority
of
Christian
Lebanese, Bashir's ruthless tactics
appeared. to payoff in the long run.
The remnants of the Tiger mili tia
were
absorbed
into
the
Lebanese
Defense Forces, and, for the first
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time,
the
Maroni tes
of
cent ral
Lebanon were united by a single
organization.
According to Lewis
Snider, "With the elimination of the
Chamounist militia, the autonomous
existence of the or iginal mili tias
carne to an end. This meant that the
political
groups
comprising
the
Lebanese forces no longer had any
independent military structures of
their own" (Snider 1984, 10).
Despite his ruthless military
tactics, Bashir displayed political
advantage.
In less than 6 years,
Bashir built an organization that
threatened
the
existence of
the
Lebanese
s ta te.
Under
his
leadership,
the
Lebanese
Defense
Forces became more than just a loose
amalgamation of family militias. By
1982, the LDF had its own foreign
affairs
department
with
representation
in
major
world
capi tals
and
a
public
services
department
with
civilian popular
committees in villages and areas
controlled by LDF Forces.
These
committees provided a wide range of
public services: police protection,
public transportation, and water,
telephone, and electricity services;
moreover, under the aegis of the LDF,
there were agencies responsible for
the regu~ation of consumer prices as
well
as a
radio and
television
network (see Barakat 1988, 309-10).
Bashir was hated by the majority
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of his countrymen; but he was loved
and lionized by those who benefited
from his patronage.
Perhaps his
considerable accomplishments within
the Phalangist community caused the
leadership-starved Lebanese to flock
around
him--even
after
his
controversial election.
Within days after his election
Bashir began to feel confident enough
in his new role as president-elect to
distance himself from his Israeli
military allies. Also, according to
David McDowall,
Bashir
began
to
realize that if Lebanon were to be
re-uni ted,
he
must
forsake
his
bullying techniques and become more
moderate (see McDowall 1983, 17)

Lessons From Bashir Gemayel
Whether
Bashir
could
have
successfully ended the civil war had
he lived is a matter of conjecture.
Most likely he would have failed.
Although popular among the masses of
Lebanese Christians, Gemayel, as his
assassination proved, had powerful
poli tical enemies.
The Chamoun and
Franjieh
factions,
whose
support
Bashir would have needed, detested
him for the slaughter of their family
and party members.
Moreover, the
Israeli
and
Syrian
presence
in
Lebanon made it virtually impossible
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for anyone to have anything more than
regional control of the country.
Also, it was planned to use Gemayel
as a surrogate in ousting the PLO
from Beirut.
Of
course,
it
is
purely
speculative to discuss what might
have happened if Bashir had lived.
However,
such speculation can be
important in understanding what is,
perhaps, the heart of the Lebanon's
problem: The Maronites feel that they
are losing control of the state which
they
claim
they
almost
singlehandedly created. In fact, Maronites
often
justify
their
destructive,
belligerent behavior in words similar
to the following: "We made Lebanon,
we can destroy it."

Symbol of the Presidency
The Maroni tes have histor ically
been suspicious of Muslim loyalty to
the Republ ic of Lebanon.
In fact,
according to Kamal Salibi, before the
Republic of Lebanon was created in
1926, lithe Sunnites had pronounced
pan-Arab
sympathies,
and
their
leaders
clamored
for
union with
Syria,
which
was
predominantly
Sunnite"_ (1976,9).
Therefore,
from
a
his tor ical
perspective, it is understandable why
the Maronites view the presidency as
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a symbol of the state that belongs,
historically, to them.
In this way,
the presidency has been both a source
of
uni ty
and
division
for
the
Maronite community.
The
presidency
has
had
a
fracturing effect on the Maronite
communi ty in another way.
As the
formulator· of foreign policy, the
president must make decisions vis a
vis
the
Arab
world
that
could
exacerbate existing divisions inside
the Maronite political community.
This became clear shortly before
Bashir Gemayel's death as doubts
about the long-standing alliance with
Israel became a source of conflict.
Some Maronite leaders favored the
alliance while the majority did not.
According to Raymond Helmick, the
"whole issue (was) made dangerous
through the reaction of a third
group, which is bitter about the
alliance and ready to purge those
most associated with Israel" (Barakat
1988, 316).

The presidency has appeared to
di vide the Maroni tes in still one
other important way.
Any Maroni te
president who wants to truly be the
president of Lebanon must ultimately
decide whether he wishes to be a
Maroni te. poli tician or a statesman
for all Lebanese. This is a serious
dilemma because, according to Raymond
Helmick, "there is no consensus on
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whether or not to trust Muslims
sufficiently to try to build a joint
society.
For many leaders it is
still a matter of ambivalence; they
haven't decided" (Barakat 1988, 315).
This
ambivalence
prefaces
the
question that gets to the heart of
the Lebanese presidential dilemma: Is
the president the leader of all
Lebanese?
Or is the presidency an
institutionalized mechanism meant to
preserve the power and prerogatives
of the Maronite community? In other
words,
the
Maronites
must
ask
themselves how committed they are to
the idea of a pluralistic society.
The test of Lebanon's viability
will continue to be whether or not
the Maroni tes will view themselves
first as Lebanese and second as
Maronites. After the 1975 Civil War
began,
one of the first to try
reconciliation
with
the
Muslim
community
(after
he
ruthlessly
consolidated his power within the
Maronite
community)
was
Bashir
Gemayel,
Whether Bashir' s attempts
to mend relations with the Muslim
Lebanese led to his assassination is
still
a
matter
of
conjecture.
However,
killing
poli ticians
who
favor
reconciliation
between
the
confessional groups is a familiar
phenomenon
in
Lebanese
politics.
Both Bashir Gemayel and Rene Moawad's
assassinations seem to confirm this.
In conclusion, the symbol and
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quest for presidential power has
magnified existing tensions within
the Maronite community. Before 1975,
the presidency was very much a boon
for the Maronite community. However,
after the Civil War began, bullets
rather
than
ballots
determined
Maronite leadership.
Consequently,
Maronite political rivalries became
more treacherous.
Bashir Gemayel
took advantage of the donnybrook
mentality of the Civil War and used
the LDP's military prowess to solve
the problem of Maroni te leadership
success ion.
In
short,
an
understanding of the divisions within
the Maronite community help diagnose
what might be considered Lebanon's
disease: the subordination of the
nation's good for the amelioration on
factional well-being.
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MARBURY V. MADISON:
A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
SHAWN GUNNARSON

Judicial review currently stands
at the heart of a heated controversy.
That controversy involves several
issues, including the proper role of
a
Supreme
Court
justice,
the
separation
of
powers,
and
constitutional
interpretation.
Difficult as it is to separate these
issues
from
each
other--they
naturally overlap--I will focus on
the institution of judicial review in
this paper.
My thesis is that
understanding judicial review as the
Founders did may provide a key to
solving
the
current
controversy
surrounding that institution.
To
understand judicial review as the
Founders did, as well as contemporary
cr i ticisms of that understanding, I
will review a variety of sources both
pr imary and
secondary.
Because
Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury
v.
Madison
established
judicial
review as a political institution,
that is where I begin.

Marbury v. Madisonl
Marshall begins his opinion by
posing the following questions:
(1)
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Does Marbury have a right to the
commission he demands?
(2) "If he
has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws of his country
afford him a remedy?"
(3)" I f they
do afford him a remedy, is it a
mandamus issuing from this court?"!
Each question deserves individual
attention to fill out Marshall's
reasoning.
Because
Marshall
establishes judicial review in answer
to the final question, it will be
examined most carefully.
Marshall argues that if Marbury
has a right to the commission he
demands,
then he must have been
legally appointed before President
Jefferson entered office.
Marshall
first ascertains that President Adams
duly appointed Marbury and that the
Senate approved Marbury's nomination.
From there the issue becomes more
intricate.
For once the President
has nominated and the Senate has
approved
a
judicial
nominee,
a
commission must be signed by the
President and sealed by the Secretary
of State with the great seal of the
Uni ted States.
Marshall concludes
that since the commission was signed
by the President and sealed by the
Secretary
of
Sta te,
Marbury' s
appointment
was
legally
binding.
Madison's counsel argues that the
commission must be delivered to be
legally binding, comparing a mandamus
to a deed.
Marshall refuses to
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accept
this
analogy
because
the
appointment would remain legal if the
commission were lost or stolen.
In
such a case a copy of the commission
would be readily made.
The salient
question,
then,
according
to
Marshall, is whether the appointment
is legally binding once the great
seal
has
been
affixed
to
the
commission.
Marshall asserts that
this is the case and concludes that
Marbury
has
the
right
to
the
commission he demands.
Marshall then asks whether the
laws of the United States afford
Marbury a remedy from the right that
has been violated.
He affirms this
and says that Madison's refusal to
deliver Marbury's commission violates
Marbury's legal right. And as in any
case where a legal right is violated,
Madison's
refusal
to
deliver
Marbury's
commission
violates
Marbury's right, "for which the laws
of his country afford [Marbury] a
remedy. 113
•
Marshall finally addresses the
question of whether or not a writ of
mandamus is the appropriate remedy in
Marbury's case.
He says that the
answer to this question depends on
three elements:
(4) "the nature of
the writ applied for,"
(5) "the
power of -this court" (6) "the nature
of the writ."1 The first question is
easily answered. A writ of mandamus
commands
II the
per formance
of
a
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particular act therein specified, and
belonging to his or their public,
official, or ministerial duty, or
di~ecting
the restoration of the
complainant to rights or privileges
of which he has
been illegally
depr i ved. 115
Based on the facts of
the case, Marshall reasons that the
nature of a mandamus makes it an
appropriate remedy for Marbury.
In review, Marbury has a right to
the commission he demands, Madison's
violation of
his
right
to that
commission may be remedied by law,
and a
writ of mandamus
is
the
appropriate remedy.
Every point has
been conceded to Marbury except one:
the power of the Supreme Court to
grant a writ of mandamus in his case.
Marshall
agrees
that
the
Judiciary Act of 1789 grants the
Supreme Court IIpower to issue .
writs of mandamus, in cases warranted
by the principle and usages of law,
to any.
. persons holding off ice
under the authority of the United
States. llo
However, MarShall argues
that
this
statutory
power
is
repugnant to the Constitution.
He
reaches this conclusion by inquiring
whether a writ of mandamus is a power
issuing from original or appellate
jurisdiction. (Marshall assumes that
the
statute
confers
original
jur isdiction--that assumption reads
lIoriginal ll into the statute.)
The principle of jurisdiction is
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important here because it is the
"Power and author i ty of a court to
hear
and
determine
a
judicial
proceeding'" or, as Marshall puts it,
"to say what the law is."~
And the
Constitution clearly spells out the
Supreme
Court's
original
jurisdiction,
while
leaving
the
Court's appellate jurisdiction to be
determined by congressional statute.~
On this distinction Marshall rests
his argument against the power of the
Supreme Court to issue a writ of
mandamus to Madison.
For if a
mandamus
is directly
related
to
original jurisdiction, and if the
Court lacks original jurisdiction in
Marbury's case, then the Court lacks
the power to issue a writ of mandamus
to Madison. But to say this implies
the power of judicial review.
Marshall's reasoning is crucial
here.
Marshall
says
that
the
language in the Judiciary Act of
1789, which authorizes the Supreme
Court to issue writs of mandamus,
contradicts the Constitution.
He
rests
this
conclusion
on
three
grounds: ( l) the Supremacy Clause;
(2) the nature of a written, limited
constitution; and (3) the nature of
judicial power.
The
Supremacy Clause of
the
Constitution
reads,
"This
Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
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made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the united States,
shall-be the supreme Law of the
Land. " I l l
This
clearly
gives
precedence to the Constitution and to
laws "made in Pursuance thereof."
But when an act of Congress directly
contradicts the Constitution, which
of them should prevail?
Marshall
answers
this
by
referring to the nature of a written,
limited Constitution. He notes that
"The
powers
of
the
legislature
[Congress] are defined, and limited;
and that those limits may not be
mistaken,
or
forgotten,
the
constitution is written."11
Because
the Constitution is one of enumerated
powers,
Marshall
reasons
that
congressional power is limited. And
one of those limits is on Congress's
power to al ter the Supreme Cour t ' s
or ig inal jur isdict ion.
For though
the Constitution gives Congress the
power
to
determine
the
Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction, it
does not grant Congress the power to
determine
the
Court's
original
jurisdiction.
Therefore Congress
cannot alter what the Constitution
specifically enumerates and leaves
outside the congressional sphere.
Marshall
answers
the
final
question- by referring to the nature
of judicial power. As I have already
noted, he affirms the right of the
Court "to say what the law is."I> He
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further argues that the jurisdiction
of the Court to decide the case
implies the power to decide which of
two
conflicting
laws
ought
to
prevail.
Moreover,
because
the
Constitution is the fundamental law,
it
"controls any legislative act
repugnant to it."I:;
On
these
grounds,
Marshall
decides that Marbury may not receive
his
remedy.
Marbury
certainly
deserves the commission he demands.
The laws clearly offer him a remedy
for the right Madison violates by
refusing
to
deliver
Marbury's
commission.
And a mandamus is the
appropriate remedy in his case. But
because the Constitution has clearly
enumerated the scope of the Supreme
Court's
original
jurisdiction,
because a mandamus belongs within
that scope, and because the Court's
original jurisdiction does not extend
to a case such as Marbury's, the
Court lacks the power to issue a writ
of mandamus in Marbury's case.

Criticism of Marbury
Marshall's reasoning in Marbury
has come under considerable attack.
Christopher Wolfe has made the useful
distinction
between
criticism
grounded in the case itself and
criticism
grounded
in Marshall's
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constitutional
interpretation. II
Under
the
first
heading
is
the
objection raised. by Jefferson, who
contended that Marshall spoke at
great length on the mer i ts of the
case before saying that the Court
lacked jurisdiction. 15
Under the
second
is
the
broader
objection
raised by those who disagree wi th
Marshall's
defense
of
judicial
review.
Jefferson's objection rests on a
sound
legal
foundation.
Legal
opinions are economical.
If a court
lacks jurisdiction or the case lacks
justiciabili ty, the opinion generally
says so directly without referring to
the merits of the case.
To do
otherwise may violate the spirit of
judicial power, which is limited to
deciding specific cases. For if the
case cannot be heard on its mer i ts
for whatever reason, the court has
the duty to say that and nothing
else. Such is the convention.
The
circumstances
surrounding
Marbury suggest why Marshall departed
from such a convention.
The nation
was eleven years old.
The first
major transfer of power from one
party to another had just occurred.
Ai though the Federalists had every
constitutional
right
to
appoint
"midnight judges," the Jeffersonians
resented the appointments and sought
to counter them.
One of those
methods
was
unconstitutional:
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refusing to deliver the remaining
judicial commissions. There was even
some talk among the Jeffersonians
that Federalist judges,
including
Supreme Court justices, ought to be
impeached. It was in this atmosphere
of novelty and acrimony that Marshall
fashioned the Marbury opinion. Given
these ci rcumstances, it is easy to
see why Marshall did not limi this
opinion
to
the
question
of
jurisdiction.
He
wanted
the
Jeffersonians
to
know
that
the
judiciary would not be controlled by
its poli tical opponents. 16
The
grounds
for
criticizing
Marshall's defense of judicial review
are
broader
and
more
complex.
Perhaps the most wounding indictment
of judicial review was leveled by
Alexander
Bickel,
who
noted
the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" of
defending
judicial
review
in
a
democratic society. 17
Bickel argues
that a democratic society rests on
the
principles
of
consent
and
representation.
The legislature,
because it is elected to represent
certain segments of "the people,"
epitomizes these principles. Bickel
extends this reasoning and finds that
judicial
review
violates
these
pr inciples.
Though he admi ts that
Hamilto~ defends judicial review in
Federalist 78 along the same lines
tha t Marshall does in Marbury, he,
nevertheless, asserts that a panel of
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justices cannot invalidate a statute
without
thereby
subverting
the
principles
of
consent
and
representation. Federal justices are
not elected; they are appointed to
terms
of
Ifgood
behavior, If
which
amounts to lifetime tenure.
This
insulates them from the kind of
political pressure that ostensibly
keeps other political offices, such
as the Presidency and the Congress,
close to the people.
The Ifcountermajoritarian difficultylf occurs when
the legislature passes a measure that
the Court rules unconstitutional. If
the legislature, which is elected and
representative, determines a policy
that it judges to be in the public
interest,
what
right
has
the
judiciary, which is appointed and
nonrepresentative, to invalidate that
policy?
The most notable answer to
this
question
is
provided
in
Federalist 78 by Alexander Hamilton.l~

Federalist 78
Hamilton defends the principle of
an
independent
judiciary
in
Federalist 78.
Since the mode of
appointment is previously discussed,
he does_ not repeat those arguments
here.
Instead, he concentrates on
the reasoning behind an independent
judiciary.
Tenure
during
Ifgood
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behavior" is the first principle of
an
independent
judiciary.
Such
tenure is, as Hamilton says, "[an]
excellent
barrier
to
the
encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body."'9
He proceeds
to characterize the judiciary as the
"least
dangerous"
branch
of
government,
because it lacks the
legislative power of the purse or the
executive power of the sword.!O It is
in this context that Hamilton defends
judicial review. And it is here that
the connection between Hamilton's
reasoning
in
Federalist
78
and
Marshall's
reasoning
in
Marbury
becomes apparent.
Like Marshall, Hamilton grounds
his defense of judicial review on the
connections between the necessity of
an independent judiciary~ the nature
of a written, limited constitution;
and the nature of judicial power .~I
Hamilton's argument is similar enough
to
Marshall's
to
largely
avoid
repeating it.!"! But Hamilton differs
from
Marshall
on
two
important
points.
Hamilton
emphasizes an
aspect
of
judicial
power
that
Marshall does not when he observes
that "the courts were designed to be
an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order,
among 0ther things,
to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to
their authority."~
And he notes an
important qualification on judicial
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power
that
Marshall
does
not
emphasize: "Liberty can have nothing
to fear from the judiciary alone, but
would have everything to fear from
its union wi th either of the other
departments."u So Hamilton provides
three pr imary reasons why judicial
review is defensible in a popular
regime. (1) An independent judiciary
provides an important check on the
excesses of the legislature. (2) The
judiciary poses less danger than the
other branches of government, so long
as it remains separate from them.
(3) The judiciary has the duty of
deciding what the law is.
Because
the Constitution is the fundamental
law, this duty implies the power of
settling
conflicts
between
the
Constitution and a statute (which
power is another name for judicial
review) .

Reply to Bickel
In light of Hamilton's reasoning,
we can answer Bickel's "countermajoritarian
difficulty."
The
legislature is the majoritarian power
in our republ ic.
As such, it has
great power. Given unlimited power,
it could prove as tyrannical as the
eighteenth-century
British
parliament.
The
Constitution
specifically limits that power by
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proscribing ex-post-facto laws, bills
of attainder, and the like.
It also
limits ~egislative power by placing
the judiciary between it and the
people.
Thus judicial review is
counter-majoritarian
only
in
the
sense that it does not allow the
legislature unlimited power to pass
laws that may alter the Constitution.
Some suggest that such judicial power
is dangerous.
Hamilton's answer to
this objection is clear: keep the
judiciary from uniting with the other
branches of government.
In other
words, so long as the judiciary does
not exercise legislative or executive
powers, it will remain "the least
dangerous branch."

Additional Criticism and
Plausible Answers
Bickel's objection to judicial
review is perhaps the strongest, but
others have posed objections that
also deserve some at tent ion.
They
may be grouped under the following
categories. (1) Lacking precedent or
textual
justification,
Marshall
invented judicial review in Marbury.
(2) The Founders disagreed over the
nature Of judicial review enough that
we may hesitate when characterizing
Marshall and Hamilton's reasoning as
authoritative.
Precedent
must
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always be seen in light of historical
context.
The United States was
fourteen years old when Marshall
wrote Marbury. Thus there was little
precedent for Marshall to rely on,
especially when we remember that the
Founders emphasized the novel nature
of the American Constitution.~5 Wolfe
notes, however, that the Court had
already entertained the question of
constitutionality in Hylton v. United
States
nearly
a
decade
before
Marbury. ~6 Though Hyl ton was decided
without
raising
the question of
constitutionality,
there was some
precedent
for
entertaining
the
question itself when the Court was
confronted with Marbury. Given this
perspective,
the
objection
that
Marshall did not pay deference to
stare decisis is unpersuasive.
Textual justification is harder
to
come
by.
Nowhere
in
the
Constitution does it read, "Any act
by another branch of government,
which
is
repugnant
to
the
Constitution, shall be invalidated by
the judiciary."
However,
Marshall
was
not
altogether without textual evidence
for
judicial
review.
The
Constitution
provides
that
"The
judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, -in Law and Equi ty, ar ising
under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their
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Authority."<!?
This
provision
certainly allowed Marshall to take
~cognizance of Marbury.
But it is the
combination of this provision, the
Supremacy Clause, and the "case or
controversy" requirement of article
III that provides Marshall with the
textual basis for his defense of
judicial review in Marbury.
Each
provision depends
on
the other.
Together they define judicial power
so as to include judicial review.
Article III, section 1 grants "the
judicial Power of the United States"
to
supreme and
inferior
courts.
Section 2 of the same article says
that those courts have jurisdiction
over certain cases and controversies.
The Supremacy Clause (article VI,
section 2) defines the relationship
between
state and
federal
laws.
Judicial
review
includes
such a
relationship by textual enumeration.
That
it
also
encompasses
the
relationship between congressional
statutes and the Constitution is
evident from the Court's power to
hear
cases
"ar ising
under
this
Constitution.""
As Marshall points
ou t,
it
would
be
absurd
to
acknowledge
this
power
without
acknowledging
the
Court's
corresponding power to invalidate a
1a w
-w h i c h
con t r ad i c t s
the
Constitution.!~
And this, of course,
is another way of expressing judicial
review.
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An answer to the second objection
must understandably be brief.
Some
argue that the Founders disagreed
over judicial review enough to make
one hesi tate in accepting Marshall
and
Hamilton's
position
as
authoritative. This argument ignores
the important relationship, which the
Founders
acknowledged,
between
judicial review and the separation of
powers.
Hamilton's
defense
of
judicial review in Federalist 78 has
already been shown in context: a
defense of an independent judiciary.
Madison may be considered an advocate
for the party opposite Hamilton. But
on this question the two agree.
As
Madison says, "The accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands . .
. may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny."JU
And he
points to the same source for this
threat as Hamilton does: unlimited
legislative power .11
In response to
those
who
suggest
that
judicial
review belongs with Congress, John
Adams suggests that Congress would be
ill-suited to judicial power because
it is "too numerous, too slow, and
too little skilled in the laws. "l:!
The Founders evidently agreed on the
necessity
for
the
separation of
powers, the pr imary threat of the
legislature to that separation, and
the impropriety of granting judicial
review to the legislature.
Some
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disagreement between the Founders
over political policies may be freely
admitted,-but they apparently agreed
with Marshall and Hamilton over what
judicial review should be. They also
agreed
that
judicial
power
is
designed to check legislative power,
a fact seemingly ignored by Bickel
and others.

Conclusion
The controversy over
judicial
review is complex but not insolvable.
Understanding judicial review as the
Founders--a
means
of
checking
legislative power and upholding the
Constitution as the fundamental law-leads us to conclude that judicial
review works best when it pursues
those ends for which it was created.
An
important
qualification
on
judicial review is that judges cannot
exercise legislative or executive
power without thereby -endangering
liberty.33
Such a conception of judicial
review
is
neither
simple
nor
dismissible.
No simple rule will
ever govern the interpretation of
law, especially if that law purports
to
be
fundamental
like
the
Constitution.
It is difficult to
interpret current statutes in light
of a text wr i t ten over two-hundred
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years ago. Yet we cannot escape this
difficulty by dismissing judicial
review.
Its history predates the
Constitution, and sound reasoning
supports its preservation. However,
it does present us wi th a dilemma
that
was
best
expressed
by
Tocqueville, who wrote "Judges seem
to intervene in public affairs only
by chance, but that chance recurs
dai ly. ",,~
Though
judges
cannot
initiate public policy as the other
branches
of
government
do,
they
nevertheless "intervene in public
affairs" almost daily.
The dilemma
is to so intervene without crossing
the
line
between
judicial
and
legislative power.
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NOTES
1.The facts of Marbury illuminate
Marshall's reasoning.
I therefore
include a brief recitation of those
facts here, for which I am indebted
to the following: Craig R. Ducat and
Harold
W.
Chase,
Constitutional
Interpretation, 4th ed., (St. Paul,
Minn.: West, 1988), 16-17.
In the election of 1800 the
Jeffersonians won control of the
Presidency
and
both
houses
of
Congress.
To keep what poli tical
power they could, the Federalists
under President John Adams appointed
a ser ies of federal judges.
When
Thomas
Jefferson
entered
the
Presidency four judicial commissions
remained undel i vered.
One of these
undelivered commissions belonged to
William
Marbury,
who
had
been
appointed justice of the peace for
the District of Columbia. Under the
direction of President Jefferson,
Secretary of State James Madisoh
refused to deliver the remaining
commissions.
Consequently, Marbury
sued Madison
before
the
Supreme
Court. Pursuant to section 13 of the
Judiciary
Act
of
1789,
Marbury
requested that the Court issue a writ
of mandamus directing Madison to
deliver the commission.
Because
Congress suspended the Court's 1802
session, the Cour t did not decide
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Marbury's case until 1803.
The
opinion of the Court was written by
Chief Justice Marshall.

2.Marbury v. Madison,
Cranch) 155 (1803).

5

U.S.

(1

3.ld., 168
4.lbid.
5.Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v.
"Mandamus. "
6.Judiciary Act, sec. 13 (1789).
7.Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v.
"jurisdiction. "
8.Marbury v. Madison,
Cranch) 177 (1803).

5

U.S.

(1

U.S.

(1

9.Constitution, art. III, sec. 2.
10.Constitution, art. VI, sec. 2.
11.Marbury v. Madison,
Cranch) 176 (1803).
12.ld., 177.
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13.lbid.
14.Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of
Modern
Judicial
Review:
From
Constitutional Interpretation to JudgeMade Law (New York, N.Y.: Basic
Books, 1986), 84.
15.lbid., 87.
16.ld.
17.Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics. 2d ed. (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1986), 16-23.
18.lt is helpful to remember the
conditions under which The Federalist
was written. It is a series of articles
written to persuade the people of New
York to ratify the Constitution. But, as
Martin Diamond suggests, "It seems
clear that its authors also looked
beyond the immediate struggle and
wrote with a view to influencing later
generations by making their work the
authoritative
commentary
on
the
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meaning of the Constitution." (Martin
Diamond, "The Federalist," in History of
Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss
and Joseph Cropsey, 3d ed., [Chicago,
III: University of Chicago Press, 1987],
659, emphasis added).
19.Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and
James Madison, Jr., The Federalist, ed.
Michael Loyd Chadwick (Springfield,
Va.: Global Affairs, 1987), 421. I will
hereafter refer to the number and
paragraph of the Federalist, instead of
edition and page number.
For
instance, this reference would be cited
simply as Federalist 78.6.
20.Federalist 78.7-8.
21.Hamilton's argument on the first two
points is so cogent and concise that I
take the liberty of reproducing it here.
"The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited
Constitl,ltion, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to
the legislative authority; such, for
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instance, as that it shall pass no bills
of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can
be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of courts of
justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void. Without
this, all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to
nothing" (Federalist 78.9).
22.To compare the two arguments, see
especially Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 176-80; and Federalist 78.922.
23.Federalist 78.12, emphasis added.
24.Federalist 78.8, emphasis added.
25.Federalist 1.2.
26.Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of
Modern
Judicial
Review:
From
Constitutional
Interpretation
to
Judge-Made Law (New York, N.Y.: Basic
Books, 1986), 80.

27.Constitution, art. III, sec. 2.
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28.Constitution, art. III, sec. 2 .
.29.Marbury v .. ·. Madison,
Cranch) 178 (1803).

5

U.S.

(1

30.Federalist 47.3.
31.See Federalist 48.3.
32.John Adams to George Wythe,
liThe
Constitution
January
1776,
Papers,
Electronic Text Corporation,
Drem, Utah.
II

33.Federalist 78.8.
34.A1exis de Tocquevi11e, Democracy
in America, trans. George Lawrence,
ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City, N.Y.:
Harper & Row, 1969), 99.
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